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Rolex Submariner Date ref. 116610LN - Oyster Bracelet - Full SetFor sale at Debonar Watches: pre owned Rolex Submariner 116610LN Date, with original papers and box. The 40mm case is made of 904L steel and is 13mm thick, a nice size for everyday use. The Submariner 116610LN is equipped with an Oyster bracelet that is made of 904L Oystersteel. While over time watches have been designed larger, the Submariner, which started as a 36mm watch in 1955, over time it grew and now stands at a larger yet conservative size of
For sale at Debonar Watches: pre-owned Rolex Submariner 116610LN Date, with original papers and box.
The 40mm case is made of 904L steel and is 13mm thick, a nice size for everyday use. The Submariner 116610LN is equipped with an Oyster bracelet that is made of 904L Oystersteel.
While over time watches have been designed larger, the Submariner, which started as a 36mm watch in 1955, over time it grew and now stands at a larger yet conservative size of 40mm than it is today.
The 116610LN was introduced in 2010, and was only recently discontinued and replaced by the newer, 41mm 126610LN n 2021.
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4.8 ★★★★★
Based on 23 reviews
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Product Reviews
★★★★★ 5
recommend this seller
Format: Paperback
great product, great seller
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Reviewed in the United States on March 4, 2026
★★★★★ 5
Globalization greatly increases leverage over opponents
I'm trying to learn more about China. This book was referenced in a book I read by U.S. General Spalding entitled "War Without Rules." The book was written by two Chinese PLA colonels and published in 1999 so it's about a quarter century old. According to General Spalding the book has been read and considered within the U.S. military. I have the paperback and it's 193 pages, not including a short afterword and some information on the authors' backgrounds. It reads fairly well although I did encounter a few places where I wasn't entirely sure what the book was trying to say. I don't know if this was due to translation challenges or it was just me. I got through the book fairly quickly.
My main takeaway was that globalization has offers a potential opponent many more levers to influence the actions of others than simply resorting to kinetic (bombs and bullets) warfare. Economic warfare is certainly possible and in the colonels' view has been resorted to by the West against Asian targets. They view George Soros as a financial terrorist who wreaked havoc on Asian economies in 1998. They describe Soros as a soldier in the wars of tomorrow. Page 191.
The inspiration for the book was the First Gulf War. The lesson that the colonels drew from this war was that it was inadvisable to fight the U.S. in a straight-up kinetic war. Finding other ways to fight the U.S. was mandatory. As I write this in January 2024 I wonder if the Chinese military will follow the colonels or if they will resort to traditional kinetic means of fighting if their leadership decides to take Taiwan.
On page 120 they describe the new model of warfare as combining the battlefield and non-battlefield exemplified by Schwarzkopf and Soros and Bin Laden and some Chinese that I don't recognize. As they say on page 120 "This then is our real hand of cards."
The book also cites a number of Chinese theorists on war, which I think I useful. I've read fairly widely, but my reading has been focused in the West. Also, the authors look at international bodies and how China might use them against the U.S.
On page 164 the book argues that warfare is changing from "bloody massacre" and finding expression in "information warfare, financial warfare, and trade warfare". Look at the U.S. response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The colonels' thoughts are worthy of consideration. On page 110 the book observes "continuous coverage by the modern media which very much strengthens the effects of terrorism."
If the topic interests you, I recommend the book. The book may be 25 years old, but its message is timely.
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Reviewed in the United States on January 9, 2024
★★★★★ 4
Intriguing Challenges and Overblown Rhetoric
This is a useful book to read. The principles of warfare advocated by Sun Tzu say that you must know both yourself and your enemy. This book shows that modern American society is known by the Chinese military. As an exercise in cultural self-understanding alone, reading it pays dividends.
However, the topic is strategy. The words used can be relatively confusing at times, not quite embodying the meaning given to them by the authors. Unlimited...but within limits. Unrestricted...but following rules. It can be a bit of a struggle to follow their train of thought and understand their meaning (especially with the writing style, which lacks clarity or organization). Despite this I think it is worth struggling with, and especially with a broad overview of some of the argument to assist. Such a board overview follows.
The main point: the United States is prone to think in a manner which intrinsically restricts the conduct of warfare to only a formal military domain; thus it abstracts military action from its location in social domains (politics, economy, information, etc). This fits rather well. We like things to be formulas or mechanistic. We also like to abstract them away into separate ("rigidly distinct") boxes which have no interaction. And so, the military is responsible for military problems and better stay far from anything approaching politics! However, as the authors reveal, this leads to an inability to conduct grander strategy in warfare.
So instead: "unrestricted" warfare is to have strategy incorporate considerations (and interactions) within various domains, not only the military domain. Basically it is a rejection of the post-Westphalian concept of the nation-state as the supreme (and exclusive) kind of agent in strategy. This is good. The post-Westphalian idea of the nation-state may be useful in certain contexts and for certain purposes, but it is NOT the comprehensive reality of the universe. To treat it as such is to be blind to much of reality, and to live in a fantasy world. Does North Korea really care that it is "unrecognized" as a nation by us? Nope. Because the nation-state idea simply doesn't describe the order in which NK exists, so much as it describes the order in which Germany exists.
This is all well and good. But is it truly revolutionary or new? I don't think so. Clausewitz himself writes that there is no military situation abstracted from the political situation, and politics (in this sense) involves much more than just inter-governmental relations. Rather, I think that we can treat this as a corrective against modern American oversimplifications and reductions, and thus as a "return" to older concepts of strategy and statesmanship. Indeed, they even imitate and follow Clausewitz's guidance on method for determining a theory of warfare which is inductive/a posteriori, rather than deductive/a priori. Unfortunately, the one "modern" example of a war they have to analyze is the Gulf War, and so they relentlessly analyze it alone, perhaps leading to imbalance.
And here is where the rhetoric is overblown. This is no "master plan" to destroy America (false advertising). It's not even really new concepts. Rather, it is a (very) forceful reminder against the false (and harmful) modernist sentiments that prevail in America's mode of conducting warfare. In reference to false understandings, the authors actually accuse Americans of "touching the elephant" - an allusion to the tale of "blind men and the elephant" (although this allusion is not made clear in the text, and so is confusing if you have not heard of the tale). It is a parable about believing one has the absolute truth, while only having a limited perspective. Perhaps the authors also touch the elephant in a few ways (bias for helicopters without empirical evidence, a near-religious adoration of the golden ratio, etc.).
There's a final point of balance that is perhaps needed. It is easy to either dismiss the Chinese critiques of American society ("we don't worship tech") or take them too seriously ("tech is evil"). Either reaction is problematic. Instead we need to understand that just as in some other areas, there is a rhetorical/political purpose at play. America is being made fun of (which means that the critiques are both based in reality, but also somewhat biased for the sake of local humor). Technology is not evil, and technology is not God. So we need to learn to avoid seeing technological advancement as a replacement for people (this is the error the authors would like to point out). This doesn't mean avoiding technological advancement.
There are many lessons to be learned from this book. I'd advise it for all military officers to read. However, I also would advise to temper the expectations and reframe the reader's conception of what the book is: it is an exercise in recovery of some older strategic concepts, not a revolutionary approach to destroying the United States. Get past and ignore the rhetoric and advertising, and take the lessons where they make valid points about where we can be short-sighted in our mindset. But don't discount those lessons because of the wild rhetoric and advertising which surround them. Doing this, you will profit.
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Reviewed in the United States on September 1, 2022
★★★★★ 5
China’s Global Strategic Approach.
Provides an excellent understanding of China’s strategy approach — which should be occurs by now, but isn’t. Its style is probably to Asian to be appreciated by most Americans — who have never studied the classic Asian way of war — and never been to war in Asia. If interested in this subject, start with Sun Tzu, and try to think like about strategy the way the Chinese understand it.
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Reviewed in the United States on February 3, 2026
★★★★★ 5
Why China is winning
Format: Hardcover
Should be mandatory reading for all men from 17 and up see why they’re going to overtake the USA unless we get our act in gear
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Reviewed in the United States on May 29, 2026